Security Analysis of a Lightweight RFID Cryptographic Protocol Based on Obfuscation Functions

A systematic security analysis of an RFID cryptographic protocol referred to as CP-LRDP, which was used for dual-tag RFID authentication systems, was performed. Formal modeling methodologies were employed on the novel obfuscation functions of CP-LRDP, and logical deductions were applied to identify critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, sensitive parameter leakage was detected under adversarial scenarios, where encrypted tag identifiers were identified as susceptible to algebraic inversion via transmitted messages. Such exploitation was demonstrated to enable identity forgery attack and thereby compromising user privacy. To mitigate this vulnerability, an enhanced framework was proposed to reinforce the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted messages. The optimized countermeasures achieved effective resistance against both identity spoofing and tracking attacks while preserving the low-computational-overhead properties of the protocol.