A Game Theory-Based Method for Secure Deployment of Mimic Honeynet

The Honeynet, as a typical active defense strategy, traps attackers' malicious behaviors, changing the asymmetric situation of network attack and defense. However, a static honeynet system would create a single deception environment, making it difficult to be effective against complex attacks. Additionally, the virtual honeypots are susceptible to exploitation by attackers, potentially leading to virtual escapes. To address the above issues, we propose a game theory-based method for secure deployment of mimic honeynet to enhance the deception capabilities of a honeynet and improve the security of honeypots. We construct multi-layer mimic honeypots and dynamically schedule the business executors within the mimic honeypot according to the virtualization layer's adjudication results, effectively preventing attacker escape attempts. We construct a Bayesian game model of attack and defense for the mimic honeynet, incorporating factors such as the attractiveness of the mimic honeypot and the similarity of the business layer. The aim of this game theory model is to determine the optimal mimic honeypot deployment strategy for a dynamic honeynet. Simulation results demonstrate that the mimic honeynet proposed in this paper effectively captures more malicious attack behaviors, reduces the probability of real hosts being attacked, and strengthens the security of the honeypot itself.