Eliminating Software Defined Radio Dependency in Satellite Security Research: A Software Based Attack Model

The proliferation of open-source software in satellite operations has introduced significant security vulnerabilities, exposing critical control systems to sophisticated cyber threats. Replay attacks on satellite command protocols have traditionally relied on Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) for signal interception and retransmission. This research represents a transformative change in satellite cybersecurity by showing that replay attacks, which formerly depended on SDRs, can now be performed entirely using software-based techniques. Utilizing Python and Scapy, we intercept and alter command packets within Open-SatKit(OSK), a popular open-source satellite control platform, proving that unauthorized command execution is possible without any physical hardware. This discovery creates a new attack surface that questions traditional security beliefs in space systems, highlighting the pressing need for strong software-based defenses. Experimental results confirm that OSK lacks robust command authentication, allowing replayed commands to be executed without detection, reinforcing the need for cryptographic validation in open-source satellite frameworks. By removing the hardware requirement for satellite penetration testing, this research democratizes cybersecurity studies within the space sector while revealing significant vulnerabilities that need urgent attention. This study establishes a new benchmark for assessing the resilience of spaceborne systems against software-driven attacks, representing a major advancement in the analysis of satellite security.