A Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Optimal Pricing and Allocation in Shared AVPC

The rapid urbanization in various metropolitan areas has exacerbated the imbalance between parking space supply and demand, posing significant challenges for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). In response, advances in sharing economy practices, exemplified by bike sharing and car sharing, offer promising solutions. However, Parking Space Owners (PSOs) are often demotivated from sharing their vacant parking spaces with Temporary Users (TUs), citing inconveniences and inadequate incentives. Moreover, the integration of autonomous driving and Automated Valet Parking and EV-charging (AVPC) paradigms into ITS introduces additional complexities. This paper proposes a contract-theoretic incentive approach for optimal pricing and parking space allocation in shared AVPC, where PSOs are incentivized to share their vacant parking resources (parking spaces or/and EV-charging piles) with TUs in exchange for compensation. Specifically, we formulate the pricing and allocation problem as a contract-theoretic optimization problem aimed at maximizing PSOs’ profits while minimizing TUs’ expenditure. The PSOs are classified into types based on their determined unit prices and service quality. To achieve the optimal contract, we design two constraints: "Incentive Compatibility (IC)" and "Individual Rationality (IR)". Then, we derive the corresponding optimal shared AVPC contracts that match PSOs’ vacant parking resources with TUs’ requests under incomplete information scenario. Comprehensive simulation results and analysis prove that the proposed approach effectively incentivizes PSOs to share their vacant parking resources with TUs while ensuring mutual benefits.