Verifiable Weighted Electronic Voting against Tally Leakage for Popular Voting Methods

Electronic voting (e-voting) plays a key role in modern democratic processes, especially in scenarios where consensus or collective decisions need to be reached. Existing e-voting schemes share the same paradigm of "one-person-one-vote" and treat all voters equally, which is unsatisfactory for weighted settings where every voter is associated with a weight. Furthermore, existing schemes suffer from critical threats towards voters’ privacy and voting results, which becomes a major hindrance towards the broad adoption of e-voting schemes in reality. In this paper, we propose a verifiable e-voting scheme, dubbed WEAPT, to support weighted e-voting with a strong security guarantee. The key technique behind WEAPT is a threshold weighted matrix aggregation mechanism with public verifiability and privacy preservation, where the Shamir secret sharing scheme, Pedersen vector commitment scheme, and zeroknowledge proofs are deployed. We provide security analyses to show that WEAPT is secure against internal and external adversaries. We implement a WEAPT prototype and conduct a comprehensive performance evaluation, which demonstrates its practical efficiency.