An Incentivization Strategy toward E2E Network Slice as a Service

Network slicing enables the deployment of multiple virtual networks over a single infrastructure network, supporting diverse network services. In particular, stringent service requirements motivate End-to-End (E2E) network slicing, where multiple independently administered network domains collectively realize an E2E connectivity. However, because internal resource details of each domain are typically hidden for privacy and administrative reasons, the limited visibility makes accurate E2E performance estimation a significant challenge before its deployment. This paper addresses the problem of truthful information sharing among domain administrators and an E2E slice resource coordinator through a game-theoretic framework. We propose an incentivization strategy based on the Shapley value from cooperative game theory to promote truthful reporting. By quantifying each domain’s contribution to the overall E2E performance, our incentivization strategy adjusts financial compensation to reflect the quality of reported information. Simulations demonstrate that our approach improves E2E performance estimation, reduces performance requirement violations, and lowers slice blocking rates.