A Generalized Stealth Attack Localization Framework for Smart Grid Network Under Real-Time Test Environment

The growth in the cyber networking for transmitting sensor measurements has raised the concern towards maintaining resiliency of the smart grid (SG) against cyberattacks. During cyberattacks, an intruder fabricates the targeted control actions by tampering with field devices or exploiting the security of communication protocols to compromise vital sensor measurements. Ensuring minimum disruption post-attack and/or early restoration of the critical operations necessitates faster troubleshooting measures. The same demands identification and localization of stealthy attacks in addition to detection. In this regard, the present work proposes a cyberattack localization task by exploiting the relation between system parameters and measured variables. A set of indices based on an analytical framework involving continuous monitoring of sensor measurements has been proposed to detect and localize any intrusion in the cyber and physical layer of the power network. The scheme has been validated for various attack scenarios in a real-time environment using Modbus communication protocol.