A Defense Method Against Zero-Dynamics Attack on Wind Power System

As wind power systems expand in size and complexity, the imperative for cyber security measures becomes increasingly critical, especially in light of the escalating threat posed by the zero-dynamics attack. Unfortunately, when the relative degree of a continuous-time system is greater than two and the sampling period is small, the sampled-data system will inevitably introduce unstable zeros, making it vulnerable to attackers. Meanwhile, it is difficult for traditional output-based system monitoring methods to detect such attacks. The current mainstream approach employs the generalized hold or generalized sampler to achieve zero shifting, but the implementation is challenging. In this article, we propose a defense method based on electronically tunable passive components to address this challenge. The method effectively defends against the zero-dynamics attack by introducing a gain-scheduling combined with the real-time parameter adjustment function of the electronically tunable passive components to move the unstable zeros of the system. Simulation results show that this defense method can improve the ability of the wind power system to resist zero-dynamics attack.