Asynchronous Control of Cyber–Physical Systems With Quantized Measurements and Stochastic Multimode Attacks

This article is concerned with the observer-dependent asynchronous control problem in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) vulnerable to multimode attacks, with a specific focus on addressing the significant challenge posed by the surreptitious nature of attack behaviors. First, in view of band-limited communication channels in CPSs, the quantizer is used to quantize the measured output. Second, owing to the open and shared network of CPSs, the data transmission process is more susceptible to attacks. A multichannel transmission framework is constructed under the assumption that each transmitted data element is susceptible to potential attacks. The switching dynamics among various attack forms launched by the adversary on the transmission channel are governed by a semi-Markov chain. The analysis of multimode attacks with stealth characteristics is conducted within the framework of a hidden semi-Markov jump mode, which is achieved by establishing a dual-layer stochastic process comprising a multimode sequence and an observed mode sequence. Leveraging emission probability, we design an observed-mode-dependent controller capable of stabilizing the system even in the absence of direct access to the actual attack patterns and in the presence of information loss. The simulations involving a single-channel unmanned ground vehicle system and a mass-spring–damper system with two channels are provided to validate the feasibility and efficacy of our proposed methodology.