Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Electricity-Carbon-Green Certificate Coupling Market Equilibrium

As the coupling relationship among the electricity, carbon, and green certificate markets deepens, the strategic profit-seeking behaviors of various participants will become increasingly complex, and each participant's revenue will be influenced by the strategies of other participants. This paper constructs an equilibrium model for the electricity-carbon-green certificate coupled market, aiming to find the equilibrium points among multiple market participants in a non-cooperative game setting. Considering that, at the early stages of establishing the electricity-carbon-green certificate coupled market, participants do not meet the requirements of complete rationality in traditional game theory, and conventional analytical methods struggle to solve equilibrium problems in large-scale markets, this study employs a market simulation method based on multi-agent evolutionary game theory. Example analyses indicate that the market equilibrium points derived from multi-agent evolutionary game theory perform better than the Nash equilibrium points obtained through traditional analytical methods.