Securing RFID Backscattering Against Jamming: Modelling, Simulations and Experimental Validation

In traditional Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks, devices generate their own signals to transmit data, which consumes more power. However, monostatic backscatter communications (BSC) can perform modulation and signal processing using an external signal from a reader, rather than generating signals from the device itself. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems operate on this monostatic backscattering technology. Despite its benefits, BSC is vulnerable to exploitation by cyber attackers, primarily due to the limited hardware capabilities of passive RFID tags. Jamming attacks can disrupt legitimate BSC systems, enabling illegal activities or allowing competitors to gain advantages. This novel empirical investigation proposes two methods, power control and location control, to enable a typical RFID system to read data even in the presence of a powerful jamming attack. The study analyzed the relationships among reader power, the reader-to-tag (R2T) distance, the jammer-to-tag (A2T) distance, and power gain. The performance was analytically characterized and evaluated through computer simulations and hardware experiments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to empirically quantify the impact of jamming attacks on RFID read rates at the reader and to assess the efficacy of physical layer security techniques in mitigating their impact. Lastly, experimental validation utilizing commodity hardware provides novel insights into optimal power and topology control for securing passive tags in sustainable IoT environments against jamming attacks.