Power Allocation Strategy of Multi-Static Radar Network Tracking Maneuvering Jammer Based on Stackelberg Game

This article investigates a power allocation strategy and performs a game equilibrium analysis for tracking a self-defense jammer in a multi-static radar network with non-ideal detection performance. Specifically, the main objective of multi-static radar network is to maximize the jammer tracking accuracy under power constraints, whereas the jammer aims to minimize the index. The closed-form expression for the Bayesian Cramér-Rao Lower Bound(BCRLB) with radiation power as variable in the non-ideal detection environment is derived and adopted as the criterion function. Then, the multi-static radar network and the jammer are taken as the leader and follower based on Stackelberg game, and the power allocation model is established to optimize their power resources. Finally, by integrating the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and cyclic minimization algorithm, an iterative two-step solution is developed to tackle the power allocation problem between two players in the game efficiently, and the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg game equilibrium are derived.