Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid

Due to its dependence on a communication network, distributed secondary control of microgrids is susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in channel shutdown mode, which may negatively impact the network connectivity and thus deteriorate the coordination and power sharing among distributed generators (DGs). Honeypot is a common method for cyber deception by introducing fake targets. However, in the context of microgrid, the misleading information spread by honeypots will also impact the system performance. This paper proposes an attack-resilient distributed control for AC microgrids utilizing virtual agents (VAs) to counteract both DoS edge and node attacks. The VAs are designed to not impact the system’s steady state during normal operation but to share information among neighboring real agents and serve as dummy targets for DoS attacks. The control with VAs is implemented by a primal-dual gradient-based distributed algorithm to efficiently obtain a practical solution for voltage/frequency regulation and power sharing. The simulation results on a 4-DG test system and a modified IEEE 34-bus system show that 1) VAs do not impact the normal functionality of the test system, and 2) deploying VAs can enhance the resilience of the microgrid control against DoS edge and node attacks.