Sawtooth-Characteristic-Based Resilient Control Design for Wireless Networked Control Systems Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

The resilient control design for wireless networked control systems (WNCSs) under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks is investigated based on the sampled-data theory in this study. Firstly, by employing a logic processor module in the control center, WNCSs under DoS attacks are modeled as aperiodic sampled-data systems (SDSs). This integrates the duration of DoS attacks into the sampling intervals, simplifying the controller design without the need for additional handling of DoS attacks. Then, a sawtooth-characteristic-based hierarchical integral inequality is presented to leverage the underused sampling sawtooth characteristic in existing studies in WNCSs under DoS attacks. Next, a high-order two-sided looped-functional caters for the proposed hierarchical integral inequality is constructed and the sawtooth-dependent free-weighting matrices are introduced into the constraint of system equation to further preserve the information of SDSs. These improvements of methodological promote a reduction in the conservatism of the stability criteria. Consequently, a resilient controller design scheme is presented based on the system substitution-based de-coupling method, resulting in a controller that exhibits enhanced counteraction against DoS attacks. The efficacy of this controller design scheme is demonstrated through a satellite control system and a load frequency control power system, showcasing the advantages of the resilient controller. Note to Practitioners—This research offers significant insights into enhancing the resilience of WNCSs against DoS attacks, which is a prevalent challenge in industrial network security. The developed solution is particularly beneficial in industries where maintaining uninterrupted control communications is critical, such as satellite systems and power systems that are vulnerable to malicious DoS attacks. The logic processor module provides a practical approach to dynamically monitor the strength and duration of DoS attacks. Based on this, the relevant system is re-modeled as an aperiodic SDS. This integration with the existing sampling theories ensures that the system makes good use of current technologies and facilitates the design of resilient controllers that can withstand DoS attacks. On the one hand, the application of this enhanced control design allows for a more robust system that maintains functionality under cyber attack conditions, thereby protecting critical operations and potentially reducing downtime and associated costs. On the other hand, this approach reduces the conservatism of controller design guidelines, allows for more efficient utilization of network resources, and improves system response. However, this approach relies heavily on the accuracy and timeliness of the logic processor’s response to DoS attacks. This may not be entirely reliable in environments with highly irregular or complex network threats.