Incentive Design of Shared ESS Energy Trading Game

This study introduces a hierarchical interaction model between a shared energy storage system (ESS) operator and self-interested ESS users, referred to as the shared ESS energy trading game (EET game). In the EET game, the ESS operator sets time-varying energy selling and buying prices to regulate energy trading among ESS users. Meanwhile, the ESS users make decisions regarding their energy selling (charging energy to the shared ESS) and buying (discharging energy from the shared ESS) schedules. We model the EET game as a generalized Stackelberg game (GSG) and define a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium (GSE) to identify the optimal strategies for both the ESS operator and ESS users. Within the EET game, we prove the existence of a variational Stackelberg equilibrium (VSE), which is a GSE. To compute this equilibrium, we utilize a gradient-based algorithm that incorporates an implicit gradient. Finally, we validate our model by simulation studies using residential households’ energy demand data and show the effectiveness of our approach in reducing both total energy cost (EC) and the peak-to-average ratio (PAR).