Event-Based Secure State Estimation for 2-D CPSs Under Deception Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach

In this article, we discuss the event-based secure estimation issue for 2-D cyber-physical systems subject to deception attacks in the sensor-to-estimator channel. The game-theoretic framework is applied to established the equilibrium defense policy against the malicious attacks, and meanwhile the dynamic event-triggered mechanism is proposed for the limited communication resource. By resorting to Lyapunov functional approach and matrix techniques, sufficient conditions are attained to assure that the considered state estimation error dynamic is asymptotically mean square stable with an $H_\infty$ performance. Then, based on the zero-sum game theory, a valid mixed defense mechanism is proposed. A defense-based remote estimator design algorithm that considers the interaction of the physical layer and the cyber layer is established. Finally, the validity of the developed estimation scheme is certificated by a simulation example.