Nash Bargaining-Based Pre-disaster Load Curtailment Contract Design for Distribution Grid Resilience Enhancement

When emergency resources are scarce in extreme weather scenarios, a distribution network (DN) with limited capacity requires load shedding, leading to unforeseen outages. The DN can actively reduce the in-event load level by pre-event load curtailment, but this may affect other users’ electricity consumption. In this work, a resilience-oriented collaboration of the load aggregator and the distribution system operator is propsed and modeled as a Nash bargaining game. In this game, a compensation contract is desinged carefully for pre-disaster load curtailments, ensuring system-level resilience enhancement with acceptable costs for both sides. A defender-attacker-defender (DAD) game is proposed to deal with the uncertain branch outages, along with evaluating the resilience enhancement effect of the proposed contract. Case studies are carried out on a modified 16-bus case, which validates the efficacy of the proposed framework.