Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations through Pool Exclusion Strategy

Social exclusion emerges as a potent mechanism to unravel the enigma of the emergence of cooperation amidst large-scale individual interactions. Preceding research has probed the role of peer exclusion strategies within spatially structured populations, albeit neglecting the facet of pool exclusion. Here, we scrutinize the evolutionary dynamics engendered by the pool exclusion strategy in the context of public goods games within structured populations. Our findings suggest that pool excluders can establish an oscillatory momentum and maintain coexistence with cooperators and free riders within the collective. When pool punishment is incorporated into the scenario, free riders rapidly seize dominance over the entire collective. Furthermore, when both pool exclusion and pool punishment are concurrently operative, our observations indicate that pool excluders can maintain coexistence with cooperators and free riders, while pool punishers are eliminated by natural selection.