Two-Player Task Negotiation Based on Trust

We propose a trust-based sequential negotiation protocol for a two-player negotiation game. The protocol encompasses negotiations evolving over multi-stages, which builds upon the foundations of the monotonic concession algorithm. Trust is a crucial element built into our method-ology. It serves to gauge the reliability of the opponent and dynamically evolves throughout each negotiation stage based on the degree of concessions made by the opponent in the previous negotiation step(s). Depending on the trust level, utility functions, negotiation tasks, and concession limits for subsequent negotiations are determined from our algorithm. A higher trust value encourages agents to adopt a more cooperative stance, whereas a lower trust value mitigates the risk of exposing sensitive information about tasks to potentially selfish agents. Furthermore, we prove that the extended Zeuthen strategy, renowned as the stable Nash strategy for conventional monotonic concession protocols, is also the Nash strategy for our trust based protocol by reducing the negotiation set through concession limits. To illustrate the efficacy of the proposed protocol and the stability of the strategy, we present a task allocation example. The example showcases both cooperative negotiations and negotiations against a deceptive selfish agent.