A security threat analysis for unified network orchestration across terrestrial and non-terrestrial resources

The integration of non-terrestrial resources in telecommunication networks necessitates complementing the traditional orchestration paradigm to cope with the heterogeneity, the temporal access, the limited resources and the flexible topology of satellite resources. The design of a unified orchestrator to jointly supervise the lifecycle and connectivity of terrestrial and non-terrestrial resources is a viable option to maintain compatibility with industry standards while facilitating integration. However, the heightened vulnerable surface area creates additional opportunities for threat actors to exploit orchestration functionalities, posing an increased risk of security breaches. In this paper, we systematically review and justify the threat surface of a unified orchestrator by leveraging standard threat analysis methodologies. Our findings highlight that network architecture elements are not prominently exposed to the same threat whether they are located on the ground or satellite segment. From our findings we issue a set of design objectives to secure a unified orchestration framework.