A differential game model of joint emission reduction in dual-channel supply chain under channel conflic

The growing awareness of low-carbon lifestyle among consumers has prompted enterprises to engage in emission reduction. In low-carbon supply chain practices, joint emission reduction is widely used for win-win collaboration. In this paper, we develop a differential game model that involves one manufacturer and one retailer in a dual-channel supply chain under the low-carbon environment. We analyze the dynamic emission reduction decisions and discuss the impacts of consumer channel preference on optimal decisions. Our results show that as the consumer preference for the direct channel increases, the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction effort also increases, while the retailer’s optimal advertising effort decreases. The emission reduction level of products monotonically increases over time, reaching a stable value, while the goodwill level initially decreases and then increases over time, ultimately reaching a stable value. The consumer preference for the direct channel has the same impact on the emission reduction level of products and goodwill level, but has an opposite impact on the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer.