The Impact of Shareholder-Firm Geographic Distance on Perquisite Consumption Based on Geospatial Big Data Analysis

In recent years, executives' perquisite consumption has become a hot topic. Perquisite consumption is a manifestation of agency costs between executives and shareholders, which not only damages the company's economic value, but also has a significant impact on the company's corporate image and cultural atmosphere. Given its hidden characteristics, how to effectively supervise perquisite consumption has also attracted widespread attention from scholars. This paper starts from the perspective of the geographical distance between shareholders and the company, combined with the external governance environment, to explore the impact of shareholder supervision on executives' perquisite consumption. The study found that there is a positive correlation between shareholder-firm geographic distance and perquisite consumption, indicating that shareholders do have a supervisory role in executives' perquisite consumption, and the farther the distance, the worse the supervisory effect. The results of the sub-sample study suggest that when the shareholder-firm geographic distance increases and the supervisory effect is weakened, institutional ownership can supplement the absent supervision of large shareholders, thus reducing the level of perquisite consumption.