EMAClave: An Efficient Memory Authentication for RISCV Enclaves

Enclave technologies have been a common solution for secure execution in the recent times. Most of the prior designs proposed for RISCV enclaves do not evaluate any performance overheads associated with encryption and integrity of data. The recent competing scheme proposed for RISCV enclaves and several other competing schemes for other architectures use an integrity tree to prevent against replay attacks, ensuring the integrity of the data. However, the downside of such approaches are multiple memory accesses required for traversing an integrity-tree and an additional storage overheads. In this paper, we propose EMAClave to ensure integrity protection using a modified bloom filter and additional hardware modifications. Moreover, we also prevent cache side channel attacks by proposing an intelligent cache allocation technology when secure and non-secure applications are running together. We show that we are able to outperform the recent competing scheme Penglai by around 16.1 %.