Toward Stealthy Backdoor Attacks Against Speech Recognition via Elements of Sound

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely and successfully adopted and deployed in various applications of speech recognition. Recently, a few works revealed that these models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where the adversaries can implant malicious prediction behaviors into victim models by poisoning their training process. In this paper, we revisit poison-only backdoor attacks against speech recognition. We reveal that existing methods are not stealthy since their trigger patterns are perceptible to humans or machine detection. This limitation is mostly because their trigger patterns are simple noises or separable and distinctive clips. Motivated by these findings, we propose to exploit elements of sound (
$e.g$
., pitch and timbre) to design more stealthy yet effective poison-only backdoor attacks. Specifically, we insert a short-duration high-pitched signal as the trigger and increase the pitch of remaining audio clips to ‘mask’ it for designing stealthy pitch-based triggers. We manipulate timbre features of victim audio to design the stealthy timbre-based attack and design a voiceprint selection module to facilitate the multi-backdoor attack. Our attacks can generate more ‘natural’ poisoned samples and therefore are more stealthy. Extensive experiments are conducted on benchmark datasets, which verify the effectiveness of our attacks under different settings (
$e.g$
., all-to-one, all-to-all, clean-label, physical, and multi-backdoor settings) and their stealthiness. Our methods achieve attack success rates of over 95% in most cases and are nearly undetectable. The code for reproducing main experiments are available at
https://github.com/HanboCai/BadSpeech_SoE
.