A VCG Energy Price Mechanism for Day-Ahead Market Clearing in Electricity-Gas Combined System Considering Energy Contracts

The locational marginal pricing mechanism is difficult to incentive market members to bid true cost information, and the coupling between power networks and natural gas networks poses new challenges to the research energy price mechanism for day-ahead market clearing in electricity-gas combined system. To incentive market participants to truthfully bid and thereby achieve an rational allocation for social resources, based on VCG in mechanism design theory, a VCG energy price mechanism of the day-ahead market clearing of electricity-gas combined system considering energy contracts. The day-ahead market clearing model of electricity-gas combined system considering energy contracts is established. The payment of each market member is defined as the substitution benefit of the member to other members, which give the settlement formula of each market member, and it is proved that the mechanism meets the requirements of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and the minimization of power grid companies purchase electricity fees and natural gas company purchase electricity fees. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is verified by the numerical examples.