Renewable Energy Power’s Investment and Production Strategies for a Class of Noncooperative Game Models of Power Sales With Risk Avoidance

This paper studies the computational problems of the optimal renewable energy power’s investment and production strategies for a class of noncooperative game models of power sales with risk avoidance considering renewable energy power production quotas and Green Power Certificate System. To accommodate the problems, the following steps are implemented: firstly, according to the objects of sales of the power produced by the energy suppliers and whether the players have characteristic of the risk avoidance, the models are subdivided into four kinds of models. Secondly, the employment of the gradient-like optimization method and the setting of auxiliary systems verify the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for each of models (ie., the optimal renewable energy utilization rates) that is globally exponentially stable. Then, the definition of the complete information static game is employed to compute the Nash equilibriums and then the optimal power production quantities and the optimal revenue functions would be calculated by relevant equations. Finally, the convergent validations for renewable energy utilization rates, the numerical validations for the optimal calculations for the four proposed models are carried out through a specific numerical example. Moreover, the impacts of players’ characteristic of the risk avoidance are investigated and remarks on the impacts are provided.