Detection and Defense Mechanism for Service Request Packet Flooding Attacks in Smart Identifier Networks

Due to the rapid growth of internet traffic, increased mobility, and heightened security requirements, signs of aging have manifested in today’s internet. To adapt to these changes and advance the internet towards the future, the Smart Identifier Network (SINET) has been proposed and is widely considered a promising architecture for the future internet. However, the security of SINET is jeopardized by a security vulnerability known as a Service Request Packet Flooding (SRPF) attack. In this type of attack, adversaries flood SINET with a large number of malicious service request packets, occupying the service request list space of routers in the network. By depleting the router’s memory resources, attackers render the router incapable of serving normal users, thereby degrading the performance of the network’s transmission. In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism against SRPF attacks based on Theil entropy and dynamic credibility. This method achieves early detection of SRPF attacks, ensuring the effectiveness and accuracy of detection, and it also effectively counters packet flooding attacks, reducing the packet loss rate for legitimate requests and safeguarding legitimate users. Simulation results demonstrate that our approach effectively mitigates SRPF in SINET.