Revenue-Optimal Contract Design for Content Providers in IoT-Edge Caching

Edge caching is crucial in the Internet of Things (IoT) by accelerating content delivery and reducing latency, offering significant advantages. However, inappropriate incentive mechanisms may prevent third-party edge caching nodes from caching data. To address the incentive challenges in edge caching, this article proposes a contract theory approach to resolve the incentive issues between content providers (CPs) (Google and Microsoft) and edge caching nodes. Initially, utilizing the framework of contract theory, the security service quality of edge caching nodes is classified into a finite number of types, and transactions between CPs and edge caching nodes are modeled. Subsequently, contract packages containing popular data content and corresponding rewards are designed for different types of edge caching nodes. Utilizing the revelation principle of contract theory addresses the problem of incomplete information in the system, enabling CPs to maximize revenue. A blockchain-based reputation mechanism is employed to identify abnormal nodes within edge caching nodes. Numerical results demonstrate that, compared to other mechanisms, our proposed contracts can effectively incentivize the participation of edge caching nodes, significantly enhance CPs’ revenue, and improve content delivery efficiency and effectiveness.