SAT and SCOPE Attacks on Deceptive Multiplexer Logic Locking

The logic locking technique has been widely used to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from unauthorized access, intellectual property (IP) theft, etc. Among various locking mechanisms, multiplexer (MUX)-based logic locking has gained attention due to its effectiveness and versatility. However, conventional MUX logic locking techniques face challenges in providing strong security guarantees. This research article focuses on evaluating the vulnerabilities of deceptive MUX (D-MUX) logic locking. It explores the potential of the oracle-guided SAT attack and the oracle-less SCOPE attack to break the scheme. The research presents the attack methodology and explores its limitations in the context of D-MUX logic locking. The SAT attack successfully breaches D-MUX in seconds, highlighting the need for more robust defense mechanisms against oracle-guided threats. On the other hand, the SCOPE attack demonstrates a partial susceptibility of D-MUX to oracle-less attacks. By incorporating attack scenarios, hardware IPs can be fortified, ensuring the integrity of ICs against evolving adversarial challenges. This research contributes to the advancement of hardware security and paves the way for more resilient hardware IP/IC designs.