A Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Two-Way Authentication and Novel Elliptic Curve-Based Encryption

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) present a unique challenge: ensuring secure communication and confidential information exchange between resource-constrained nodes. Conventional cryptography mechanisms for authentication are often costly and inefficient in this setting. To address this, two-way authentication schemes have emerged as a leading solution for balancing security and energy efficiency. However, existing identity-based protocols suffer from limitations like weak security, high computational overhead, and increased communication latency as network size grows. This stems primarily from the reliance on pairing and mapping functionalities in current techniques. This paper reviews the cryptosystem proposed by Vivek et al. [1] titled A Pairing Free Identity Based Two Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol Using Hexadecimal Extended ASCII Elliptic Curve Cryptography”. We analyze its security using Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and identify a potential side-channel attack that could compromise encryption under certain conditions. Additionally, we highlight the scheme’s strong resistance to differential cryptanalysis. Overall, while Vivek et al.’s proposal demonstrates promising features, addressing the identified side-channel vulnerability is crucial for its practical implementation.