Cell Manipulation Attack Against Onion Services

In this study, we proposed OREA-OS, a cell manipulation attack devised to compromise Onion Services. Through the manipulation of cells, two collaborating nodes within a circuit exchange information to unveil the anonymity of the targeted Onion Service. We conducted an analysis of existing de-anonymization scenarios and effectively addressed the associated challenges, thereby achieving successful de-anonymization of Onion Services. To assess the efficacy of our attacks, we conducted experiments on both private and public Tor networks. The experimental results validate the effectiveness of our approach, as we accomplished 100% accurate identification of the relationship between domain names and Internet Protocol addresses, with no false positives. Within our simulated private network, the recall rate neared 100 %. On the public Tor network, the de-anonymization rate (98.6 %) exceeded the successful download rate (98.2 %). Furthermore, 99.2 % of success attacks took less than 10 seconds to confirm.