Peaking Control Strategy of Stackelberg Game for Buildings Based on Cluster Classification Incentive

In the current power market environment, the building group load-side adjustable resources are abundant, the regulation potential is huge, and it has an important participation status in the peaking scenario, but the power grid and building users as the main body of different interests, the economic trade-off between the two is crucial for the enhancement of peaking participation in the building group and the excavation of the regulation potential, therefore, a cluster classification incentive mechanism is designed to promote the active participation of building users in demand response, based on the Stackelberg game theory, and an optimal control model is established to maximize the economic benefits of the participating users in demand response, and a control strategy to satisfy the demand is obtained by optimizing the tariff information released by the grid, and adjusting the electricity consumption strategy of the building user group to achieve Nash equilibrium; after simulation, it is verified that the proposed model can satisfy the demand of the grid for peak shifting while optimizing the economic performance of the main bodies and give full play to the response potentials of multiple loads in the building.