Integral Attack on 5 Rounds SLIM Algorithm

The resilience of the SLIM algorithm against integral attacks can be tested by activating one to four nibbles at positions 5, 6, 7, and 8 for all possible positions. Attacks can be carried out to recover the keys of the third, fourth, and fifth rounds using an integral distinguisher with 16 unbalanced nibbles. Key recovery is performed by searching for slices of the key candidates from three delta sets for each integral distinguisher. To find the seed key, it’s done by looking for the round key from the first round to the fifth round. The third round key is obtained from research on the delta set that have a three round integral distinguisher, while the fourth round key has a four rounds integral distinguisher. Applying an integral attack on the SLIM algorithm by activating one to four nibbles with all position variations is ineffective after five rounds, because all the nibbles on the SLIM algorithm are unbalanced, so that the full rounds of the SLIM algorithm is safe against integral attack.