Analysis of Cruise Ship Supply Chain Cooperation Model Selection and Price Decision Based on Network Externality

Under the background that the domestic cruise market is exclusively sold by travel agencies, this paper studies the influence of network externalities on the profit of each main body of the cruise travel supply chain, the price of tickets, the sales effort of travel agencies, etc., and then discusses the coordination mechanism and price decision between cruise companies and travel. In this paper, it is assumed that a cruise company and a travel agency constitute the cruise tourism supply chain, and the Stackelberg master-slave game model is constructed to study the supply chain decision equilibrium solution under the existence of network externalities, charter ship mode, commission mode, and centralized decision mode. The results show that: (1) With the enhancement of network externality, the selling price of ferry tickets and the sales effort of travel agencies are improved. (2) The profit of cruise companies, travel agencies, and even the total profit of the entire cruise travel supply chain increases with the enhancement of network externality. The research results can provide a theoretical reference for cruise companies and travel agencies when choosing cooperation mode and making ticket price decisions when network externalities change.