Bidding Strategy Analysis of Large-Scale Wind Farms Participation in Energy-Frequency Regulation Markets Based on Mean Field Game

To cope with the increased complexity of traditional methods caused by large-scale wind power grid connection, the bidding strategy based on mean field game for large-scale wind farms' participation in energy-frequency regulation markets is proposed. By analyzing the biding behavior of a finite number of wind farms, a mean field game model for large-scale indistinguishable wind farms simultaneously participating in energy-frequency regulation markets is developed, which consists of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation describing the optimal bidding capacity of the wind farm and the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation describing the probability density of bidding capacity. The solution to the coupled equations was achieved using the fixed-point iterative method and the finite difference method. Finally, the simulation was validated using German wind power data. The results reveal the wind farms' bidding capacity and bidding price in energy-frequency regulation markets as market demand changes.