On the Security of Lightweight Authentication and Batch Verification in VANETs

Recently, researchers have focused on the authentication and key agreement (AKA) approach to enable a secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interface. Often, these security measures are effective against passive snoopers who tap the links to decipher the conversation. Nevertheless, it has been noted that if the protocol were severely constructed, an active saboteur may mimic legal vehicles or change the broadcast message. In this paper, we cryptanalyze a recently proposed AKA protocol shown as lightweight compared to the state-of-the-art. We employ conventional and cutting-edge techniques to decipher algebraic systems while releasing many forgeries. Using cryptanalysis, we demonstrate that the algorithms and characterizations of this protocol are susceptible to a range of security concerns, such as insufficient anonymity, session-independent key agreement, exposing multiple keys, replay, and vehicle impersonation. In addition, this article provides remarks for developing a secure lightweight V2X authentication system.