Introducing benchmarks for evaluating user-privacy vulnerability in WiFi

WiFi-based crowdsensing is a major source of data in a variety of domains such as human-mobility, pollution-level estimation, and, opportunistic networks. MAC randomisation is a backbone for preserving user-privacy in WiFi, as devices change their identifiers (MAC addresses). MAC association frameworks in the literature are able to associate randomized MAC addresses with a device. Such frameworks facilitate the continuation and validity of works based on device-based identifiers. In this paper, we first question and verify the reliability of these frameworks with respect to the datasets (scenarios) used for their validation. Indeed, we observe a substantial discrepancy between the performances obtained by these frameworks when confronting them with different contextual environments. We identify that the device heterogeneity in the input scenario is privacy-preserving. Henceforth, we propose a novel metric: randomization complexity, capable of successfully catching the degree of randomization in evaluated datasets. Existing and new frameworks can thus be benchmarked using this metric to ensure their reliability for any datasets with similar or lower randomization complexities. Finally, we open discussions on the potential impact of the benchmarks in the domain of MAC randomization.