TVLA*: Test Vector Leakage Assessment on Hardware Implementations of Asymmetric Cryptography Algorithms

Test vector leakage assessment (TVLA*) evaluates the side-channel leakage of sensitive information from the hardware implementation of a design. While TVLA* for symmetric cryptography has been well studied, it is not applicable to asymmetric cryptography algorithms. Asymmetric-key algorithms involve complex computations in multiple stages that can lead to varying trace lengths depending on input parameters and associated constraints. In this article, we design an effective TVLA* technique for asymmetric-key cryptosystems that can compare lengthy trace data with a good statistical resolution and generate valid input (test) patterns to satisfy specific constraints. Specifically, this article makes the following major contributions. The proposed test generation algorithm can produce valid test patterns to maximize the power signature differences. Our proposed partition-based differential power analysis can significantly improve the TVLA* accuracy. Extensive evaluation using elliptic curve cryptography algorithms demonstrates that the proposed TVLA* framework can handle type 1 and type 2 statistical errors and evaluate hardware implementations of asymmetric cryptography algorithms with a statistical confidence of 99.999%.