Nash Equilibria for Exchangeable Team against Team Games and their Mean Field Limit

We study stochastic mean-field games among finite number of teams each with large finite as well as infinite numbers of decision makers (DMs). We establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) and show that a NE exhibits exchangeability in the finite DM regime and symmetry in the infinite one. We establish the existence of a randomized NE that is exchangeable (not necessarily symmetric) among DMs within each team for a general class of exchangeable stochastic games. As the number of DMs within each team drives to infinity that is for the mean-field games among teams), using a de Finetti representation theorem, we establish the existence of a randomized NE that is symmetric (i.e., identical) among DMs within each team and also independently randomized. Finally, we establish that a NE for a class of mean-field games among teams (which is symmetric) constitutes an approximate NE for the corresponding pre-limit game among teams with mean-field interaction and large but finite number of DMs.