PUF-based Hardware Trojan: Design and Novel Attack on Encryption Circuit

The threat of Hardware Trojans (HT) has gradually increased in recent years. Our study proposes a novel attack with a new class of HT based on physical unclonable function (PUF) to leak information. This study aims to analyze and evaluate the performance of our PUF -based HT and raise awareness about the advanced version of HT. We employed a full-custom design flow, which translated the HT's layout into a compact footprint. This lightweight implementation requires only 749 FETs and an area of 10.6437 mm
²
, indicating a high barrier to detection by conventional methods of testing and inspection. Moreover, the signature of the recommended PUF-based HT is physically encrypted so that even if anyone successfully detected the trojan, it would not allow unwarranted activation of the HT. To assess the feasibility of our PUF -based HT, we performed simulation on Tanner EDA and physical test on FPGA; we were also able to leak information successfully.