A Novel Stackelberg-Game-Based Energy Storage Sharing Scheme Under Demand Charge

Demand response (DR) using shared energy storage systems (ESSs) is an appealing method to save electricity bills for users under demand charge and time-of-use (TOU) price. A novel Stackelberg-game-based ESS sharing scheme is proposed and analyzed in this study. In this scheme, the interactions between selfish users and an operator are characterized as a Stackelberg game. Operator holds a large-scale ESS that is shared among users in the form of energy transactions. It sells energy to users and sets the selling price first. It maximizes its profit through optimal pricing and ESS dispatching. Users purchase some energy from operator for the reduction of their demand charges after operator's selling price is announced. This game-theoretic ESS sharing scheme is characterized and analyzed by formulating and solving a bi-level optimization model. The upper-level optimization maximizes operator's profit and the lower-level optimization minimizes users' costs. The bi-level model is transformed and linearized into a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model using the mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) method and model linearizing techniques. Case studies with actual data are carried out to explore the economic performances of the proposed ESS sharing scheme.