Resilient Defense of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids via Virtual Hidden Networks

The resilient defense strategy for the false data injection attacks (FDIAs) from the perspective of structural vulnerability of smart grids, by using graph and cybernetic approaches, is investigated in this article. FDIA is a kind of well-designed cyberattack that can bypass traditional bad data detection methods and, thus, cause serious damage to smart grids. To defend against FDIAs, a resilient defense control strategy based on virtual hidden networks is proposed to improve the structural vulnerability of smart grids in this study. First, a reduced-dimensional local consensus dynamic model is derived by the Kron reduction method. Second, a virtual hidden network interconnected with the grid is constructed and designed by using the graph theory to indirectly improve the structural vulnerability of the smart grid. In addition, a competitive interconnection approach based on the network zero-sum game is used to further improve the structural vulnerability of the smart grid. The resilience of the smart grid can be effectively improved by changing the topology of the virtual hidden network and the interconnection bipartite graph. Third, the stability of the virtual hidden network-based defense controller is demonstrated separately under either cases without or with FDIAs. The results show that the addition of the virtual hidden network does not change the steady-state operating point of the original grid, but can effectively mitigate the impact of FDIAs on the smart grid. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated on the IEEE 14-bus grid and on the New England 39-bus grid, respectively.