A Node-labeling-based Method for Evaluating the Anonymity of Tor Network

In order to better evaluate the anonymity of the Tor network, this paper evaluates the degree of the Tor network anonymity by calculating the probability of routing links being hijacked when users communicate under different node labels. According to the official routing node algorithm, we discuss the results of link establishment from the perspective of node labeling separately and calculate the hijacked rate of different links based on the established evaluation model. The experimental results based on the real data of nodes provided by the official CollecTor website show that the Tor network can resist the intrusion of 10% of malicious nodes, and the anonymity of the Tor network decreases rapidly when the malicious nodes in the routed nodes exceed 20%. In a collection of nodes with different labels, nodes with exit labels have a greater impact on system anonymity when subjected to the same level of attack.