Non-Uniform Pricing and Resource Allocation Economics for HetNet Based on Stackelberg Game

With the popularization of the two-layer distributed heterogeneous network between the macrocell and the femtocell, the interference problem in the heterogeneous network will become more and more complex. The interference of the femtocell base station (FBS) to the macrocell base station (MBS) limits the achievable rate throughput of the macrocell system. In this letter, a two-stage Stackelberg game was used to design a non-uniform pricing scheme to solve the problem. In order to get this scheme, it was first made that MBS management platform and femtocell system are equivalent. Then we set an incentive mechanism in both stages, and solve the optimization problem in two stages. In the first stage, MBS management platform charged for interference. In the second stage, the total benefit of the entire femtocell system could be get based on the cost and the benefit of each femtocell. FBS made a reasonable allocation of transmission power for each femtocell user (FUE) according to the total benefit. These two stages are mutually constrained and mutually supportive. Finally, we get Stackelberg equilibrium of the Stackelberg Game as a non-uniform pricing scheme. We use the simulation experiment to prove that this scheme is superior to the uniform pricing scheme.