Optimal Dynamic Load-Altering Attacks Against Power Systems

In this paper we study dynamical load-altering attacks in power networks, where an attacker aims to destabilize the network by modifying a portion of the loads present in it, and provide a provable method to design such attacks. From a practical standpoint, dynamic load-altering attacks are easily implemented by tampering with demand response and demand side management services, and can greatly compromise the efficiency and reliability of the grid. From a technical standpoint, dynamic load-altering attacks act as sparse perturbations to the network matrices that alter key dynamical properties, thus constituting a form of distributed or sparse controller for network systems. We cast the problem of designing minimally-invasive destabilizing load-altering attacks as a sparse stability radius optimization problem, and present a numerical algorithm to efficiently compute optimal destabilizing load-altering attacks. This analysis provides a vulnerability map that identifies secure and vulnerable loads in the power network. We illustrate our results using the IEEE-39 bus system.