SixPack: Abusing ABS to avoid Misbehavior detection in VANETs

This paper presents SixPack, a cyber attack to VANET communications that is able to go undetected by the current state-of-the-art anomaly detectors. The SixPack attack is a dynamic attack conducted by an insider attacker who modifies the content of the Basic Safety Messages to pretend a sudden activation of the braking system with the consequent activation of the Anti-lock Braking System, and create a fake representation of the vehicle. The attacker then rejoins the fake representation of the vehicle with the real one, avoiding the current state-of-the-art anomaly detectors. We experimentally evaluated the evasion capabilities of the SixPack attack using the F
²
MD test framework on the LuST and LuSTMini city scenarios, demonstrating the ability of the attacker to generate a high percentage of false positives that prevent the attack from being detected consistently.