Multi-agent bidding and contracting for non-storable goods

We study electronic bidding and contracting for nonstorable goods such as electric power using multi-GA agents and game theoretical approaches. In this framework there is a long-term contract market as well as a back-stop spot market. Seller agents bid into an electronic bulletin board their contract offers in terms of price or capacity, while buyer agents decide how much to contract with sellers and how much to shop from the spot market. The problem is modeled as a von-Stackelberg game with seller agents as leaders. We investigate if artificial agents will be able to discover equilibrium strategies if such an equilibrium exists; and if the agents can discover good and effective strategies when playing repeated nonlinear games where there does not exist any equilibrium. This study is a companion of our earlier theoretical characterizations on optimal bidding and contracting strategies for nonstorable goods, now adopting an agent-based approach.