Introduction
One of the main open questions in blockchain systems research is developing reward mechanisms that incentivize honest protocol execution and decentralization. Bitcoin, the dominant example of proof-of-work blockchains, has been criticized for its susceptibility to protocol deviation attacks (e.g., selfish-mining [15] and mining games [23]), its tendency to centralise via the creation of mining pools [1], [20], [27], [42], and its high-energy expenditure. To address mainly the latter problem, many proof-of-stake (PoS) [5], [12], [24], [29] blockchains have been proposed. Despite progress in the understanding of the security properties of PoS blockchains, designing a robust incentive mechanism that promotes decentralization remains open.
We can abstract the problem that is to be solved as follows. Consider a society of agents that have stake in a joint effort that is recorded in a ledger and want to run a collaborative project (which might be maintaining the ledger itself). Stakeholders actively engaged in the project will incur operational costs (potentially different across the stakeholder population) and hence the project should provide some rewards to offset these costs. The stakeholders have the option to actively participate in maintenance or abstain from it. We will assume that the project can draw funds from a reward pool enabling, potentially at regular intervals, to distribute in some way a reward
There are three dominant approaches that have been considered in the PoS context. In the “direct democracy” approach, every stakeholder participates proportionally to their stake, which has downside that the operational costs can be so high that they discourage participation from small stakeholders resulting in so-called “whales” completely dominating the system or, in the worst-case, having operations stopping altogether. In the “jury” approach, followed by PoS systems like [11], [29], a random subset of
Our Results
In our setting there are
Given a reward sharing scheme that belongs to the above class, the players will pick their strategy that determines whether they will run a pool or not and whether they will allocate some or all of their stake to pools created by other players. Natural questions about these games are: Do they have pure equilibria? Do they possess desirable properties such as decentralisation? Do the best-response dynamics converge fast to them?
An important and interesting observation here is that the standard notion of utility and Nash equilibrium for this game fails to capture what we intuitively expect to happen. The reason is that at a Nash equilibrium the players do not have to take into account the impact their selection will make on the moves of the other players. In particular, all Nash equilibria (if they exist) will have margins
Our main result is the introduction and analysis of a novel reward sharing scheme that is parameterized by (1) the desired number of pools
Definition 1: A Sybil-Resilient Cap-and-Margin Reward Scheme
Given a target number of pools \begin{equation*}
(1)\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad r(\sigma,\ \lambda)\sim\sigma^{\prime}+\alpha^{\prime}\lambda,
\tag{1}
\end{equation*}
If the primary aim of the reward scheme, i.e., to have pools of size
Our main theorem about this reward sharing scheme is the following.
Theorem 1: Informal Statement
There exists a Nash equilibrium for the reward scheme of Definition 1 that satisfies
exactly
pools are created, each of sizek ,1/k the pool leaders are the players with the highest value of
where\begin{equation*} (2)\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad P(s_{i},\ c_{i})=r(\beta,\ s_{i})\cdot\frac{R}{1+\alpha}-c_{i}, \tag{2} \end{equation*} View Source\begin{equation*} (2)\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad P(s_{i},\ c_{i})=r(\beta,\ s_{i})\cdot\frac{R}{1+\alpha}-c_{i}, \tag{2} \end{equation*}
ands_{i} are the stake and cost of player\mathrm{c}_{i} , andi is the total reward distributed to the players, andR players have no incentive to lie about their cost
.c_{i}
The quantity
It follows immediately from the above theorem that we obtain an equilibrium that achieves the primary decentralization and fairness objective. Regarding Sybil resilience, observe that the potential of the players is controlled by the parameter
Non-myopic utility and dynamics. We also tackle the question of whether the equilibrium guaranteed by our theoretical analysis is effectively reachable when players are engaged in the game. We consider non-myopic dynamics with players applying a natural best-responce strategy to each other's moves in succession. Specifically, the players compute the desirability of each announced pool, which is the answer to the following question of the players: “if I allocate a small stake
Equilibria and incentive compatibility. Our reward sharing scheme has a Nash equilibrium in which the reward is distributed fairly among all stakeholders, except for pool leaders that get an additional gain (Proposition 2). A nice property of this additional gain is that, all else being equal, it increases by at most
Deployment considerations in the PoS setting. We provide a comprehensive list of potential attacks and deviations as well as how they are mitigated in a deployment of our RSS in the setting of a PoS protocol such as [24]. These include “rich get richer” considerations censorship1 and Sybil attacks, as well as how to deal with underperforming pool leaders that fail to meet their obligations in terms of maintaining the service.
Related Work
A number of previous works considered the incentives of mining pools in the setting of PoW-based cryptocurrencies (as opposed to PoS-based ones) such as Bitcoin [14], [36], [37], [40]. The main differences between mining pools in Bitcoin and stake pools in our setting are that (i) in Bitcoin all pool members perform mining and hence incur costs, while in PoS setting, only the pool leader runs the underlying protocol and incurs a cost while delegators have no cost, (ii) in Bitcoin each pool leader can choose a different way to reward pool members/miners while in our setting we prescribe a specific way for rewards to be shared between pool members. Regarding centralization, Arnosti and Weinberg, [1], have established that some level of centralisation takes place in Bitcoin in settings where differences in electricity costs are present between the miners. Also according to [27] in a setting where each unit of resource has a different value depending on the distribution of the resources among the players, miners have incentives to create coalitions. These results are inline with our (even more centralised) negative result on fair RSS's for the PoS setting, cf. Section 2.2. Another aspect we do not explore here, is the instability of such protocols when the rewards come mostly from transaction fees; this was explored in [6], [42].
With respect to PoS blockchain systems, a different and notable approach to stake pools is to use the stake as voting power to elect a number of representatives, all of equal power, as in delegated PoS (DPoS) [26]; for example, the cryptocurrency EOS [21] has 21 representatives (called block producers). This type of scheme differs from ours in that (i) the incentives of voters are not taken into account thus issues of low voter participation are not addressed, (ii) elected representatives, despite getting equal power, are rewarded according to votes received; this inconsistency between representation and power may result in a relatively small fraction of stake controlling the system (e.g., at some point, controlling EOS delegates representing just 2.2% of stakeholders was sufficient to halt the system,5 which ideally could withstand a ratio less than 1/3), (iii) it may leave a large fraction of stakeholders without representation (e.g., in EOS, at some point, only 8% of total stake is represented by the 21 leading delegate2). Yet another alternative to stake pools is that of Casper [5], where players can propose themselves as “validators” committing some of their stake as collateral. The committed stake can be “slashed” in case of a proven protocol deviation. This type of scheme differs from ours in that (i) stakeholders wishing to abstain from protocol maintenance operations have no prescribed way of contributing to the mechanism (as in the case of voting in DPoS or joining a stake pool in our setting), (ii) a small fraction of stake may end up controlling the system while at the same time leaving a lot of stake decoupled from the protocol operation; this is because substantial barriers may be imposed in becoming a validator (e.g., in the EIP proposal for Casper3 it is suggested that 1500 ETH will be the minimum deposit, which, at the time of writing is more than $370K); this can make it infeasible for many parties to engage directly; on the other hand reducing this threshold drastically may make the entry barrier too low and hence still allow a small amount of stake to control the system. As a separate point, it is worth noting that for both the above approaches there is no known game theoretic analysis that establishes a similar result to the one presented herein, i.e., that the mechanism can provably lead to a Nash equilibrium with desirable decentralisation characteristics that include a high number of protocol actors and Sybil attack resilience. The compounding of wealth in PoS cryptocurrencies was studied in [16] where a new notion denoted by “equitability” is introduced to measure how much players can increase their initial fraction of stake. Also they prove that a “geometric” reward function is the best choice for optimizing equitability under certain assumptions; we remark that it is a folklore belief that PoS systems are inherently less equitable than ones based on PoW, however this belief seems to be unfounded, cf. [22]. With respect to equitability we show that by calibrating our Sybil resilience parameter to be small our system becomes “equitable” in the sense of providing similar rewards to stake pool leaders independently of their wealth.
From a game-theoretic perspective, our setting has certain similarities to cooperative game theory in which coalitions of players have a value. In our setting the players have weights (stake) and they are allowed to split it into various coalitions (pools). Our objective is to have a given number of equal-weight coalitions, which contrasts with the typical question in cooperative game theory on how the values of the coalitions are distributed (e.g., core or Shapley value) in such a way that the grand coalition is stable [32]. Actually, the games that we study are variants of congestion games with rewards on a network of parallel links, one for every potential pool. The reward on each link is determined by the reward function, which essentially determines an atomic splittable congestion game. But unlike simple atomic splittable congestion games [30], our games have different reward for pool leaders and for pool members. There are two main research directions for such games: whether they have unique equilibria and how to efficiently compute them [3]. Regarding the question of unique inner equilibria the most relevant paper to our inner game is [31] (but see also [2], [35]) which shows that under general continuity and convexity assumptions, games on parallel links have unique equilibria. However, the conditions on convexity do not meet our design objectives and they do not seem to be useful in our setting.
Our work is related to two aspects of delegation games, which are games that address the benefits and other strategic considerations for players delegating to someone else to play a game on their behalf, such as owners of firms hiring CEO's to run a company. The first aspect is somewhat superficially related to this work in pool formation the pool members delegate their power to pool leaders. The second aspect which is much more relevant to our approach is that delegation changes the utility of the players (for example, by considering “credible threats” [38], [39]) or creates a two-stage game [17], [41], [43]. A typical two-stage delegation game is non-myopic Cournot competition [18] in which in the outer game the firms (players) decide whether to be profit-maximizers or revenue-maximizers, while in the inner game they play a simple Cournot competition [28]. Unlike our case, the inner Cournot competition has a simple unique equilibrium which defines a simple two-stage game.
Another research area that is relevant to this work is mechanism design, because participants may have an incentive not to reveal their true parameters, e.g., the cost for running a pool [30], [44].
In the proof of work setting, [19] considers reward sharing rules for proof-of-work systems under the assumption of discounted expected utility and identifies schemes that achieve fairness. Furthermore, an axiomatic approach to reward schemes of proof-of-work systems is taken in [8] in order to study fairness, symmetry, budget balancing and other properties. Unlike our work that considers incentives for pool formation with desirable properties, these two papers study intrinsic properties of the system given an existing pool formation.
Finally, after the first version of the present paper was made public (on the arXiv repository, cf. [4]), another work, [25], studied a parameterized notion of decentralization, where, in an ideal system, all participants should exert the same power in running the system, independently of their stake. This is a significantly more demanding notion of decentralization than the one considered here, where in an ideal system, participants exert power proportional to their stake. It is argued in [25] that in order for a system to achieve full decentralization, there must exist a strictly positive Sybil cost, that is, the cost of running two or more nodes should be higher when the nodes belong to the same entity than to multiple entities. Clearly in systems with anonymous users, Sybil costs cannot be positive and such concept of decentralization is impossible.
Organization
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. First in Section 2.1 we describe the general concept of reward sharing schemes for stake pool formation. In Section 2.2 we study a particular, simple and seemingly “fair” reward sharing scheme that follows the logic rewards are provided in the Bitcoin protocol. We show that it fails to decentralize. Then, in Section 2.3 we present “cap-and-margin” reward sharing schemes, the class of schemes we introduce and study. The formal treatment of the stake pools game is provided in Section 3 that includes the definition of the relevant utility functions. In Section 4 we put forth our scheme; its game theoretic analysis is presented in Section 4.2 in the constrained setting where players declare at most one stake-pool. This restriction is then lifted in Section 4.3 where we also study the Sybil resilience properties of the scheme. Finally, we present our experimental results in Section 5. In Appendix A we first go over deployment considerations and then provide some further analysis about Sybil attacks in Appendix B. Some omitted proofs are given in Appendix C. A more refined two-stage game theoretic analysis of our main result from Section 4 is provided in Appendix D. Finally an addendum to our experiments section can be found in Appendix E.
Reward Sharing Schemes
For an overview of our notations we refer to Figure 5.
2.1. Model and Definitions
There are
We assume that the stakeholders are rational in the sense that they want to maximize their utility and that there are no externalities, i.e., outside factors that affect the reward of the pool and the players.
Our primary objective is to incentivize the stakeholders to form a certain number of pools (smaller than the number of players). We further want no pool to have a disproportionally large size, so that no group can exert disproportionally large influence. Ideally, we want to find a reward scheme that, at equilibrium, leads to the creation of many almost equal-stake pools independently of (i) number of players (ii) the distribution of stake and costs (iii) the degree of concurrency in selecting a strategy. This seems like an impossible task4, so we have to settle for solutions that achieve the above goals approximately under some natural assumptions about the distribution of stake and costs and about the equilibria selection dynamics.
We summarize the model here. Formal definitions of the concepts follow next.
Reward Sharing Schemes (RSS) for Stake Pools
The class of reward sharing schemes we investigate is parameterised by a function
The reward scheme distributes a total fixed amount
to the pools according to their stakeR and the stake of their pool leader\sigma_{i} . In particular poola_{i,i} gets reward\pi_{i} withr(\sigma_{i}, a_{i,i}) . Note that we don't have to distribute the whole amount\sum_{i}r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})\leq R . Formally, the functionR takes the stake of a pool and the stake of the pool leader allocated to this pool and returns the payment for this pool so that:r(\cdot, \cdot) .\sum_{i}r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})\leq R , which means that a pool with no stake will get zero rewards.r(0,0)=0 The reward
of each poolr(\sigma_{i},a_{i,i}) is shared among its pool leader and its stakeholders. This may be done in a number of ways but in any case, the pool leader should get an amount\pi_{i} to cover the declared cost for running the pool. We will focus our investigation on reward schemes that are proportional, i.e., those schemes that have the property that the ratio of the rewards obtained by stakeholderc_{i}^{-}= \min(c_{i},\ r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})) over the rewards of stakeholderj_{1} in poolj_{2} equals\pi_{i} , with the only exception being for pool leaders who may be considered for additional rewards.a_{j_{1},i}/a_{j_{2},i}
The Stake Pools Game and Utility Function
Based on a reward scheme as described above, we can define the stake pools game where the strategies of the players are their allocations of their stake to their own as well as the other available pools. In this game each player \begin{equation*}
u_{i,i}=\begin{cases}
r(\sigma_{i},a_{i,i})-c_{i} & \mathrm{for} \ r(\sigma_{i},a_{i,i}) \leq c_{i}\\
\frac{a_{i,i}}{\sigma_{i}}\cdot(r(\sigma_{i},a_{i,i})-c_{i}) & \mathrm{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\end{equation*}
\begin{equation*}
u_{j,i}=\begin{cases}
0 & \mathrm{for}\ r(\sigma_{i},\ \alpha_{i,i})\leq c_{i},\\
\frac{a_{j,i}}{\sigma_{i}}.\ (r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})-c_{I}) & \mathrm{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\end{equation*}
2.2. Fair RSS's and their Failure to Decentralise
In this subsection we will show that if we use a “fair” reward sharing scheme, then we will end up in an equilibrium with at most one pool, which means that this scheme fails our decentralization objective.
Specifically consider the fair allocation that sets
We prove the following (see the full version of this paper in [4] for the proof) the following theorem:
Theorem 2
Given the above reward sharing scheme: (I) There is no equilibrium where more than one pool is created.
(II) If there exists
Experimental Results-Dynamics
Given the above the- orem, we then experimentally investigate how fast such systems centralize. We use three different initial states for these experiments:
“Maximally decentralized”, where every player whose cost
is lower than his stakec_{i} runs a pool and all other players are passive.s_{i} “Inactive”, where no player runs a pool.
“Nicely decentralized”, where ten players run a pool, and the others delegate to these pools in a way that makes them all equally big.
Our experiments show that the convergence to the results predicted by the theory is fast: If at least one player has stake greater than cost and hence runs a pool, all players will end up delegating all their stake to this single pool ending up in a “dictatorial” single pool configuration. The simulation in the experiment has players selected at random taking turns and playing best-response attempting to maximise their utility. More details regarding how the experiments are executed refer to Section 5 where we overview our experiments.
In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we present a graphical representation of the experiments. Different colors correspond to different pools. The x-axis represents time while the
In the following theorem (i) we generalise the impossibility result to the case of any function
Theorem 3
I) If
For the proofs see the full version of this paper in [4].
2.3. RSS with Cap and Margin
Motivated by the failure of the fair reward sharing scheme, in this section we will put forth a wider class of reward sharing schemes that fare better (as we will demonstrate) in terms of incentivizing players to create many pools of similar size.
Our first key observation for a reward function to have better potential for decentralization is that while it should be increasing for small values of the pool's stake, something that will incentivize players to join together in pools to share their costs, the rewards should plateaux after a certain point in order to discourage the creation of large pools, or equivalently to incentivize the breakup of large pools into smaller ones. This suggests that rewards will be capped.
Our second observation is that it is sensible to treat pool leaders in a preferential way with respect to rewards. Recall that in the case when the rewards of the pool are more than the cost, the cost is subtracted from the rewards of the pool and, if we treat everyone proportionally, the pool leader should get the same rewards as a pool member having delegated the same stake to the pool. On the other hand, in the case when the pool does not get enough rewards to compensate its operational cost then the difference is paid by the pool leader. So the pool leader bears an extra risk compared to regular pool members and it makes sense to be compensated for that. Thus, in our reward scheme we will consider that the pool leader can ask for an extra reward compared to the other members. This reward will be a fraction of the pool's profit and this fraction will be denoted by the margin value
Reward Sharing Scheme with Cap and Margin
A reward scheme for stake pools that incorporates the above features will be called reward sharing scheme with cap and margin. Formally:
Definition 2: Reward Sharing Schemes with Cap and Margin
A reward sharing scheme with cap and margin is a reward sharing scheme that (1) is parameterised by a function
(as before)
, where\sum_{i=1}^{n}r(\sigma_{i},\ \alpha_{i,i})\leq R the total rewards.R (as before)
.r(0,0)=0 , when\frac{d[(r(\sigma,\lambda)-c)\cdot\frac{1}{\sigma}]}{d\sigma} > 0 . This means that the reward function is increasing for small values of pool's stake to incentivize players to join together in pools to share the cost.\sigma\leq\beta \mathrm{def}=\frac{1}{k} when\forall\lambda r(\sigma,\ \lambda)=r(\beta,\ \lambda) . This means that the reward function is constant for large values of the pool's stake to discourage the creation of large pools.\sigma > \beta
Example dynamics for the fair reward sharing scheme
Example dynamics for the fair reward sharing scheme
Example dynamics for the fair reward sharing scheme
the reward
of each poolr(\sigma_{i}, a_{i,i}) is shared among its pool leader and its stakeholders. The pool leader gets an amount\pi_{i} to cover the declared cost for running the pool. A fractionc_{i}^{-}=\min(c_{i},\ r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})) of the remaining amountm_{i} is the pool leader compensation for running the pool. This fraction is referred to as margin. The rest(r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})-c_{i}^{-}) is distributed to the stakeholders of the pool, including the pool leader, proportionally to their contributed stake.(1-m_{i})\cdot(r(\sigma_{i},\ a_{i,i})-c_{i}^{-})
To analyze the outcome of a reward scheme, we need to define the game induced by it, which in turn depends on our assumptions about how far-sighted the players are when calculating their best response. We analyze the natural assumption that each player computes their utility using the estimated final size of the pools (under the assumption that the other players act in the same way). The utility of the players in this setting depends on the desirability
Stake Pools Game Formal Treatment
The stake pools game with cap and margin. Without loss of generality we assume that every player can be the leader of only one pool and each player has stake at most
Definition 3: Strategy of a Player
The strategy of a player
, where(m_{i},\ \lambda_{i}) is the margin andm_{i}\in[0,1] the stake that player\lambda_{i} will commit if he activates his own pool.i that is the allocation of playerS_{i}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})}=\vec{a}_{i}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})} stake giveni^{\prime} . When the(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda}) can be inferred from the context we will use(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda}) for simplicity.\vec{a}_{i} denotes the stake that player\alpha_{i,j}\in[0,1] allocates to pooli so that his total allocated stake is\pi_{j} . This allows for stake\sum_{j=1}^{n}a_{i,j}\leq s_{i} of the player to remain unallocated. In additions_{i}-\sum_{j=1}^{n}a_{i,j} .a_{i,i}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})}\in\{0,\ \lambda_{i}\}
Definition 4: Pools
Given a joint strategy
The restriction that only player
Non-myopic utility for reward sharing schemes with cap and margin. Recall that the strategy of player
A crucial observation is that if we extend directly the utility we have defined in the game for stake pools so that it includes margin, then in the game defined by the above set of strategies, the notion of Nash equilibrium does not match the intuitive notion of stability that an equilibrium is supposed to provide. Note that, in the context of a Nash equilibrium, when players try to maximize utility, they play in a myopic way, which means that they decide based on the current size of the pools and they do not take into account what effect their moves have on the moves of the other players and thus, ultimately, in the eventual size of the pools. To see the issue, suppose that we have reached a Nash equilibrium in this game, that is, a set of strategies from which no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. The obvious problem is that at Nash equilibrium all margins will be 1. This is so, because by the definition of the Nash equilibrium the other players will keep their current strategy, and the best response of a pool leader is to select the maximum possible margin. Thus, if there is room to increase the margin, the strategy cannot be a Nash equilibrium and hence the only equilibrium, if it exists, will exhibit all margins to be to their maximum value 1. There are two problems here: first we definitely don't want the margins to be 1, and second, such an outcome is not expected to be a stable solution anyway! (In a sense contradicting the intuitive notion of what a Nash equilibrium is supposed to offer). If all margins are 1, a non-myopic player (a forward-looking player who tries to predict the final size of the pools after the other players play) who is not a pool leader can start a new pool with smaller margin which will attract enough stake to make it profitable.
For these reasons, in order to analyse our reward sharing schemes with cap and margin we will use a natural non-myopic type of utility which enables the players to be more far-sighted. Thus, in the analysis, players will not consider myopic best responses but non-myopic best responses. Specifically, a player computes his utility using the estimated final size of the pools instead of the current size of the pools. The estimated final size is either the stake that the pool leader has allocated to this pool or the size of a saturated pool. The latter is used when the pool is currently ranked to belong among the most desirable pools and the former when the pool does not belong among them. It follows that a non-myopic player that considers where to allocate his stake, would want to rank the pools with respect to the estimated reward at the Nash equilibrium. But this reward is not well-defined because the Nash equilibrium depends on the decisions of the other players. It makes sense then to use a crude ranking of the pools. Such a ranking can be based on the following thinking: “An unsaturated pool” where I will place my stake will also be preferred by other like-minded players if it has relatively low margin and cost, and substantial stake committed by the pool leader (the last one is essential only when
Definition 5: Desirability and Potential Profit
The potential profit of a saturated pool with allocated pool leader stake \begin{equation*}
(3)\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad D_{j}(\vec{S}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})})=\begin{cases}
(1-m_{j})P(\lambda_{j},\ c_{j}) & \mathrm{if}\ P(\lambda_{j},\ c_{j})\geq 0\\
0 & \mathrm{elsewhere}
\end{cases}
\tag{3}
\end{equation*}
Note that the desirability of a pool depends on its margin, the stake of the pool leader allocated to this pool and its cost.
Definition 6: Ranking
Given a joint strategy
Given the ranking, we define the non-myopic stake of a pool to be either the stake allocated by the pool leader or the size of a saturated pool. The first one is used when the pool does not belong to the
Definition 7: Non-Myopic Stake
The non-myopic stake of pool \begin{equation*}
(4)\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \sigma_{j}^{NM}(\vec{S}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda}))}=\begin{cases}
\max(\beta,\ \sigma_{j})& \mathrm{if}\ rank_{j}\leq k\\
a_{j,j}& \mathrm{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\tag{4}
\end{equation*}
To simplify the notation we use
Definition 8: Non Myopic Utility
The utility \begin{align*}
& u_{i,j}(\vec{S}^{(\vec{m}, \vec{\lambda})})=\\
& \begin{cases}
0,\ \mathrm{if}\ \pi_{j}\ \text{is inactive}\ (\alpha_{j,j}=0)\\
(1-m_{j})(r(\beta,\ \lambda_{j})-c_{j})^{+}\frac{a_{i,j}}{\sigma_{j}^{NM}},\ \text{else if}\ rank_{j}\leq k\\
(1-m_{j})(r(\lambda_{j}+a_{i,j},\ \lambda_{j})-c_{j})^{+}\frac{a_{ij}}{\lambda_{j}+a_{ij}}\ \mathrm{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
The utility \begin{align*}
& u_{j,j}(S^{(m,\lambda)})=\\
& \begin{cases}
0,\ \mathrm{if}\ \pi_{j}\ \text{is inactivc}\\
r(\sigma_{j}^{NM},\ \lambda_{j})-c_{j},\ \text{else if}\ r(\sigma_{j}^{NM},\ \lambda_{j})-c_{j} < 0\\
(r(\sigma_{j}^{NM},\ \lambda_{j})-c_{j})(m_{j}+(1-m_{j})\frac{\lambda_{j}}{\sigma_{j}^{NM}})\ \mathrm{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
The utility of player
A Sybil Resilient Reward Sharing Scheme
In this section, we first outline the motivation behind our choice of the parameterized reward function.
Motivating our solution. We propose a reward sharing scheme with cap and margin cf. Definition 2. To motivate this choice, let us first consider a reward function \begin{equation*}
r(\sigma,\ 0)\sim\min\{\sigma,\ \beta\},
\end{equation*}
Recall a pool is saturated when its total stake
To evaluate the quality of a reward scheme, we should compare the resulting equilibrium with an optimal solution. An optimal solution when all participants act honestly and selfishly is to have
Sybil behavior and resilience. In particular we want to disincentivize Sybil strategies [13]) that create multiple identities declaring potentially lower costs for each one. We distinguish two types of Sybil behaviors: the first one captures a non-utility maximizer who wants to control 50% of the system. Such level of control enables a party to perform double spending attacks on the blockchain or arbitrarily censor transactions. The second type of Sybil behavior is that of a utility maximizer that creates multiple identities with their corresponding stake-pools sharing the same server back-end and thus also the operational costs. Such a player limits decentralisation by reducing the number of independent server deployments that provide the service. Observe that this also can include coalitions of players that decide to act as one. Such behavior cannot be excluded in the anonymous setting that we operate. The best possible that we can hope for is to lower bound the stake of the Sybil player to be linear in the number of identities that it creates. We analyse the Sybil resilience of a reward sharing scheme by estimating the minimum stake
To address this issue we design a reward sharing scheme that guarantees that players can attract stake from other players only if they commit substantial stake to their own pool. This is precisely the reason for considering reward functions that depend, besides the total stake of the pool, on the stake of the pool leader.
Ideally, we want the pools to be created by the players ranked best according to
The objective is to design a reward scheme that provides incentives to obtain an equilibrium that compares well with the above optimal solution. On the other hand, we feel that it is important that the mechanism is not unnecessarily restrictive and all players have the “right” to become pool leaders.
The natural way to accomodate this in our scheme, would be to use the above reward function but apply it to
4.1. Our RSS Construction
Given our target number of pools \begin{equation*}
r_{k}(\sigma,\ \lambda)=\frac{R}{1+\alpha}\cdot[\sigma^{\prime}+\lambda^{\prime}\cdot\alpha\cdot\frac{\sigma^{\prime}-\lambda^{\prime}\cdot(1-\sigma^{\prime}/\beta)}{\beta}],
\end{equation*}
We have:
The next proposition shows that the proposed function is suitable for a reward sharing scheme with cap and margin.
Proposition 1
The function
Proof 1
It holds
, as\sum\nolimits_{i=1}^{n}T(\sigma_{i},\alpha_{i,i})\leq R and\frac{\sigma_{i}^{\prime}-\alpha_{i,i}^{\prime}\cdot \frac{(\beta-\alpha^{\prime})}{\beta}}{\beta}\leq 1 .[\sigma_{i}+\alpha_{i,i}\cdot \alpha]=\sum\nolimits_{i=1}^{n}\sigma_{i}+\alpha\cdot \sum\nolimits_{i=1}^{n}\alpha(i,i)\leq 1+\alpha .r(0,\ 0)=0 When
it holds:\sigma\leq\beta .\frac{d[r(\sigma,\lambda)-c)\cdot\frac{1}{\sigma}]}{d\sigma} > 0 , when\forall\lambda r(\sigma,\ \lambda)=r(\beta,\ \lambda) because we have\sigma > \beta .\sigma^{\prime}=\min\{\sigma,\ \beta\}
This completes the proof.
4.2. Perfect Strategies
We define a class of strategies and we prove that they are Nash equilibria of our game (Theorem 4). This class has the following characteristics: exactly
Perfect Strategies
We define a class of strategies, which we will call perfect. The margins are\begin{equation*}
m_{j}^{\ast}=\begin{cases}
1-\frac{P(s_{k+1},c_{k+1})}{P(s_{j},c_{j})} & \mathrm{when}\ j\leq k\\
0 & \mathrm{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\end{equation*}
Note that when
The following proposition gives the utilities at perfect strategies and it follows directly from Definition 8 of the non-myopic utilities of pool members and pool leaders and our reward function described in this section.
Proposition 2
In every perfect strategy, (i) the utilities of the players are:\begin{equation*}
u_{i}=P(s_{k+1}, \ c_{k+1})\frac{s_{i}}{\beta}+(P(s_{i},\ c_{i})-P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1}))^{+},
\tag{5}
\end{equation*}
To justify the proposition note that all the players get a fair reward, in the sense that it is a constant
Theorem 4
Every perfect strategy is a Nash equilibrium.
Before presenting the proof of the theorem we start with some definitions and preliminary results.
Definition 10: Desirability of a Player
Desirability of a player will be the desirability of their pool. If they do not have one, their desirability will be the desirability of a hypothetical pool with their cost, the margin they have chosen and their personal stake.
Note that for uniformity we assume that all the players decide a margin even if they do not create a pool. In addition, when we rank the pools in this subsection, we will take into account also the hypothetical pools described above. Ties break in favor of potential profit. In the two-stage game that we examine in Appendix D we remove these assumptions (regarding hypothetical pools and ties as (i) we do not take into account non active pools in the ranking because we consider their desirability as zero (ii)ties in ranking break arbitrarily).
The following lemma is very useful and its proof follows directly from the definition of the reward function.
Lemma 1
The quantity
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the utility of pool members. We will give an equilibrium that matches this upper bound.
Lemma 2
In every joint strategy in which some player
The proof is described in Appendix C.
We are now ready to present the proof of the Theorem in Appendix C.
It is interesting to note that in the first case of the proof of Theorem 4, the pool leader of a pool with stake
4.3. Sybil Resilience and Large Stakeholders
We now turn to the analysis of Sybil attacks as well as of the effect that large (“whale”) stakeholders have in the game. Recall that in the previous section we restricted players to having stake at most
We analyze two scenarios in this setting. In the first one, there is a utility non-maximizer agent with total stake less than 1/2, who creates
For a given agent, denote by
Theorem 5
Consider an agent controlling a set of players
The proof is described in the full version of this paper in [4]. We observe that in both cases, the minimum stake needed by the Sybil attacker agent is asymptotically linear in the number of stake pools
In this section we provide some further context w.r t. the bounds provided in Theorem 5. Specifically, when
Finally, we provide a probabilistic analysis of the event that a utility non-maximizing Sybil attack with
Experimental Results
We next describe our experimental evaluation.
Initialization
We simulate 100 players, and we use
Furthermore, we assign a cost to each player, uniformly sampled from
Player Strategies
Each player can either lead a pool with margin
A pool leader can keep their pool, but change their margin, or close their pool and delegate to other pools.
A player without pool can change its delegation or start a pool.
If a pool leader decides to close their pool, all stake delegated to that pool by other players automatically becomes un-delegated.
Simulation Step
In each step, we look for a player with a move that Increases the player's utility by a minimal amount7. If a player with such a move is found, we apply that move and repeat. If not, we have reached an equilibrium. We have to deal with the technical problem that for each player, there is an infinity of potential moves to consider. We solve the technical problem in an approximate manner as follows:
For pool moves, instead of considering all margins in [0, 1], we restrict ourselves to one or two margins, namely 1 (to consider the case where the player plans running a one-man pool) and the highest margin
that has a chance (we make this precise below) to attract members (calculated to a precision of 10−12 if such a margin exists).m < 1 For delegation moves, we approximate the optimal delegation strategy using a local search heuristic (“beam search”8), Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to a resolution of multiples of 10−8 of player stake.
Example dynamics of our reward sharing scheme
The stake-distribution used for all experiments (but see the paragraph on other choices of the parameter at the end of this section.
How Players Choose their Strategy in a Non-Myopic Way
We have the problem of how to avoid “myopic” margin increases: It is tempting for a pool leader to increase their margin (or for a delegating player to start a pool with a high margin), but such a move only makes sense if sufficiently few other players have incentive to create more desirable pools during the next steps (this means that the competition is low). To be more precise: If a player
In order to determine whether \begin{equation*}
(r-c)[m^{\prime}+(1-m^{\prime})q] > u.
\end{equation*}
We see that \begin{equation*}
m^{\prime} > \frac{u-(r-c)q)}{(r-c)(1-q)}
\end{equation*}
Note that this procedure of choosing the strategy reflects the fact that players in our theoretical analysis try to maximize their non-myopic utility.
Additional Experiments Allowing Simultaneous Moves
As explained above, in each simulation step we look for one player with an advantageous move and allow that player to make his move. In a real-world blockchain system however, players will probably be allowed to move concurrently, so we did some additional experiments allowing for this. Instead of picking just one player, we allowed several players with utility-increasing moves to make their move in one step. It is possible that such moves contradict each other (for example when one player closes a pool that a second player wants to delegate to). We handled this by applying the moves in order and dropping those that were invalid. Furthermore, in order to allow the system to stabilize, we blocked players from making “pool moves” (creating or closing a pool or changing the margin) too often by only allowing delegation moves for a number of steps after a player has made a pool move. Of course before we declare an equilibrium having been reached, we wait long enough to see whether any player wants to make a pool move after his waiting period is over. An example for five players being allowed to move simultaneously and a waiting period for the next pool move of 100 steps can be seen in Figure 9 in the Appendix.
Other Choices for the Parameter of the Pareto Distribution
In all experiments discussed until now we used the same stake distribution of players drawn from a Pareto distribution with parameter 2 (shown in Figure 7). We picked this parameter for resulting in an apparantly realistic distribution, but our results are not sensitive to this choice. To demonstrate this, in the full version of this paper [4] we run additional experiments (for high costs and high
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Duncan Coutts for extensive discussions and many helpful suggestions. The second author was partially supported by H2020 project PRIVILEDGE # 780477. The third author was partially supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 321171 (ALGAME).
Appendix A.Deployment Considerations
Deployment Considerations
In this section we overview various deployment considerations of our RSS solution as well as we address specific attacks and deviations against our reward sharing scheme, specifically, (i) pools that underperform in general, (ii) participants who play myopically, (iii) pools that censor undesirable delegation transactions, (iv) pool leaders not truthfully declaring their costs, and (v) parties who try to gain advantage by exploiting how wealth may compound over time (“the rich get richer” problem) in a series of iterations of the game.
Regarding deployment, in order to facilitate the use of an RSS within a PoS cryptocurrency, e.g., [5], [12], [24], [29], the ledger should be enhanced to enable special transactions which allow players to delegate their stake to a pool and reassign it at will during the course of the execution. Describing in more detail the exact cryptographic mechanism for performing this operation is outside the scope of the present paper. It is sufficient to note that the mechanism is simple and very similar to issuing public-key certificates; see e.g., [24] for a description of such a delegation mechanism. Recall that in a PoS cryptocur-rency, the protocol is executed by electing participants in some way based on the stake they possessed in the ledger; informally every protocol message is signed on behalf of particular coin that is verifiably elected for that particular point of the protocol's execution. In the stake pool setting, the PoS protocol will be executed with the pool leaders representing the pool members whenever the coin of a member is elected for protocol participation.
ILL-Performing Stake Pools
In our system, rewards for a pool are calculated based on the declared stake of the pool leader as well as the stake delegated to that pool. This provides an opportunity for a pool leader to declare a competitive pool and subsequently do not provide the service that it promised (presumably gaining in terms of the actual cost that system maintenance incurs). This can be addressed by calibrating the total rewards
Players who Play Myopically and Rational Ignorance
Myopic play is not in line with the way we model rational behavior in our analysis. We explain here how it is possible to force rational parties to play non-myopically. With respect to pool leaders we already mentioned in Section 2.3 that rational play cannot be myopic since the latter leads to unstable configurations with unrealistically high margins that are not competitive. Next we argue that it is also possible to force pool members to play non-myopically. The key idea is that the effect of delegation transactions should be considered only in regular intervals (as opposed to be effective immediately) and in a certain restricted fashion. This can be achieved by e.g., restricting delegation instructions to a specific subset of stakeholders at any given time in the ledger operation and making them effective at some designated future time of the ledger's operation. Due to these restrictions, players will be forced to think ahead about the play of the other players, i.e., stakeholders will have to play based on their understanding of how other stakeholders will as well as the eventual size of the pools that are declared. A related problem is that of rational ignorance, where there is some significant inertia in terms of stakeholders engaging with the system resulting to a large amount of stake remaining undelegated. This can be handled by calibrating the total rewards
Censorship of Delegation Transactions
In this attack, a pool (or a group of pools) censors delegation transactions that attempt to re-delegate stake or create a new pool that is competitive to the existing ones. In the extreme version of this attack a “cartel” of pool leaders control the whole PoS ecosystem and prevent new (potentially more competitive) pools from entering or existing members from delegating their stake. Actually, this is a typical threat to all “political” systems in which power is delegated to representatives. However, in PoS systems even a single pool that does not censor attacks is sufficient to prevent this attack assuming there is sufficient bandwidth to record the delegation transactions in the blocks that are contributed by that pool. It is an interesting question to address the case where all stake pools form a coalition that decides to prevent any more pools from being created. A potential way forward to preventing such abuse of power by pool leaders, is by either creating the right system safeguards and incentives for the coalition to break or rely on direct member participation that will override the pool leader cartel. In this latter case, pool members acting as system “watchdogs”, without getting any reward, could still create alternative blocks, that take precedence over the blocks issued by the block leader in this way creating a ledger fork along which censorship is stopped.
Costs and Incentive Compatibility
In our analysis, we assumed for simplicity that the costs are publicly known; in reality the actual costs for participating in the collaborative project are known only by the player, who may lie about it in the cost declaration. This will happen when the players may see it as an advantage to lie about their cost. This problem is one of mechanism design which has objective to design an incentive compatible mechanism, i.e., a mechanism that gives incentives to players to declare their costs truthfully. We next argue that, in fact, our RSS is incentive-compatible as presented. Let us consider the perfect Nash equilibrium from Definition 9 in which the utilities are given by Equation 5. Suppose that a pool leader
“Rich Getting Richer” Considerations
In a PoS deployment, our game will be played in epochs with each iteration succeeding the previous one. Using the mechanisms we described above regarding censorship and Sybil resilience, it is easy to see that players are not bound by their past decisions and thus they will treat each epoch as a new independent game. A special consideration here is what frequently is referred to as the “rich get richer” problem, i.e., the setting where the richest stakeholder(s) amass over time even more wealth due to receiving rewards leading to an inherently centralised system (it is sometimes believed that this issue is intrinsic to only PoS systems but in fact it equally applies to PoW systems, cf. [22]). In order to address this issue we observe that the maximum rewards obtained by each pool at each epoch are in the range
Appendix B.Sybil Resilience-Further Notes
Sybil Resilience-Further Notes
In this addendum to Sybil resilience, we examine the probability under reasonable probability distributions that there exists an agent who has stake more than
Let
Theorem 6
Assume that \begin{equation*}
Pr(s_{1} > \frac{k}{2}\cdot s_{\frac{k}{2}+1})\leq e^{-\delta^{2}\mu/3},
\end{equation*}
For the proof see the full version of this paper in [4].
Note that if we take
increasing as a function of
and decreasing as a function of\tilde{n} andT \alpha increasing as a function of
if and only ifk . In particular when\frac{\theta^{a}k^{\alpha-1}}{2^{\alpha}T^{\alpha}}. (k+2\cdot\alpha\cdot\tilde{n}-\alpha\cdot k) > 1 is increasing as a function of\alpha=1,\delta if and only ifk .T < \theta\cdot\tilde{n}
Appendix C.Proofs of Subsection 4.2
Proofs of Subsection 4.2
Proof of Lemma 2
It suffices to show that player
Specifically, when
When \begin{align*}
& (1-m_{l})(r(\lambda_{l}+a_{j,l},\ \lambda_{l})-c_{l})^{+}\frac{a_{j,l}}{\lambda_{l}+a_{j,l}}\\
& \leq(1-m_{l})(r(\beta,\ \lambda_{l})-c_{l})^{+}\frac{a_{j,l}}{\beta}\\
& =D_{l} \frac{a_{j,l}}{\beta},
\end{align*}
Proof of Theorem 4
We first consider the simplified setting where players are mutually exclusively pool leaders or pool members.
Consider first a player
Suppose that the player decreases their margin. This increases their desirability so that the new rank is still one of the first
ranks. Since the non-myopic stake remains the same9, this move will decrease the utility of the player.k Suppose that the player increases their margin. Since before the change the first
players have the same desirability, the player's desirability drops and the rank becomes larger thank+1 . As a result the player will be alone in a pool and their utility can only decrease (Lemma 1).k Suppose that the player becomes a pool member of other pools. By Lemma 2, their utility can be
at most, which is lower that their current utility byP(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})s_{j}/\beta (by Equation 5).P(s_{j},\ c_{j})-P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})
We now consider a player
We now sketch the full argument that considers the more complex strategies of possibly simultaneously delegating and creating a pool for each player (we remark that this case is also subsumed in the two-stage game described in Appendix D and in more detail in the full version of this paper in [4]. Note that the desirability and thus the rank of the pools does not depend on the size of the pools. So if we allow strategies where a player is pool leader and simultaneously delegates some stake to other pools, then the perfect strategies remain Nash equilibria. In addition, it is easily verified that Lemmas 1, 2 hold also in this case.
If a player
with stake\in\{1,\ \ldots,\ k\} and costs increases their margin fromc tom^{\ast} and delegates stakem^{\prime} to other pools then their pool will have rank higher thans-\lambda and their utility will becomek which is no higher than\frac{\lambda}{\lambda}. (r(\lambda,\ \lambda)-c)+P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})^{-}\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta} because\frac{\lambda}{\beta}\cdot P(\lambda,\ c)+P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})\cdot\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta} increasing for\frac{r(\sigma,\lambda)-c}{\sigma} (Lem-mas 1). This is at most\sigma\leq 1/k that is equal to their current utility.(m^{\ast}+(1-m^{\ast})\cdot\frac{\lambda}{\beta}). P(s,\ c)+P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})\cdot\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta} If a player
with stake\in\{1,\ \ldots,\ k\} and costs decreases their margin fromc tom^{\ast} and simultaneously transfers stakem to other pools, then the desirability of their pool remains the same, increases or decreases. We will prove that in all cases their utility will be at most their current utilitys-\lambda .(m^{\ast}+(1-m^{\ast}) \cdot\frac{s}{\beta})\cdot P(s,\ c) If the desirability of their pool remains the same, then (i) the utility for the part of their stake that remains in their pool denoted by
will decrease because of the lower margin or will remain the same and (ii) the utility for the stake that has been transferred to other pools denoted by\lambda will also decrease because these pools have the same desirability and their non-myopic stake will become higher thans-\lambda .1/k If the desirability of their pool decreases, then the rank of their pool will become higher than
regardless the stake this player delegated to other pools. So again the utility for both parts of stake will decrease.k If the desirability of their pool increases then their utility will become
.(m+(1- m) \cdot\frac{\lambda}{\beta,})P(\lambda,c)+.\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta}\cdot P(s_{k+1}, c_{k+1})\\(m^{\ast}(1-m^{\ast}\frac{\lambda}{\beta})P(s,c)+\frac{s-\lambda)}{\beta} P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})\leq .P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})=(m^{\ast}+(1-m^{\ast})\cdot\frac{s}{\beta}) .P(s,\ c)
If a player
with stake\in\{1,\ \ldots,\ k\} and costs does not change margin and transfers stakec to other pools then again their utility will becomes-\lambda . because\frac{\lambda}{\lambda}\cdot(r(\lambda,\lambda)-c)+P(s_{k+1},c_{k+1})\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta}\\ \mathrm{their\ pool\ will \ have\ rank\ higher\ than} k If a player
with stake\in\{k+1,\ \ldots,\ n\} and costs creates a pool with stakec and delegates the remaining stake to other pools then their pool will have rank lower than\lambda so their utility will bek which is not higher than their current utility(r(\lambda,\ \lambda)-c)+\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta}\cdot P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})\leq P(\lambda,\ c). \frac{\lambda}{\beta}+\frac{s-\lambda}{\beta}\cdot P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1}) .\frac{s}{\beta}\cdot P(s_{k+1},\ c_{k+1})
Appendix D.A Two-Stage Game Analysis
A Two-Stage Game Analysis
We will next prove that our reward sharing scheme effectively retains the same perfect equilibria outcome of Theorem 4 also in a more realistic two-stage or “inner-outer game.” The advantages of this approach are as follows: (i) it allows us to analyze non-myopic moves in response to pool leaders changing margin or allocation, (ii) it allows us to remove the assumption that a player can be either a pool leader or a pool member, (iii) in this setting when a pool has not been activated, we define its desirability to be zero, something that gives us a more realistic result, because in practice only pools that have already been created will be ranked; (iv) in this game we break ties in ranking in arbitrary ways, not only according to potential profit. We note that similar non-myopic type of play has already been considered in other settings, notably in Cournot Equilibria, as is discussed in the introduction and related work.
Our “inner-outer game” consists of two games. In the outer game, player
In the inner game, the margins
For a joint strategy
In this framework, we describe a set of joint strategies that (i) are approximate non-myopic Nash equilibria of the outer game and (ii) have the characteristic that in the inner games defined by these joint strategies, all the equilibria form
The intuition for how the set of margins of these joint strategies is determined is the following: The
Definition of the game. In order to also capture non-myopic moves in response to pool leaders changing margin or allocation, we define a two-stage game, the “inner-outer game”. Similar non-myopic play has already been considered in other games, most notably in Cournot Equilibria, as is discussed in the introduction and related work. In this section we reuse non-myopic utility and desirability as defined in previous sections, but when a pool has not been activated in the inner game, we define its desirability to be zero. This gives us a more realistic result, because in practice only pools that have already been created will be ranked. In addition we remove the assumption that a player can be either a pool leader or a pool member. We order players by
In the inner game, the margins
Definition of Equilibria for Inner and Outer Game
Definition 11
A joint strategy \begin{equation*}
u_{j}(S_{j}^{\prime(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})},\vec{S}_{-j}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})}\leq u_{j}(\vec{S}^{(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})})
\tag{6}
\end{equation*}
To define the non-myopic equilibrium of the outer game, let us temporarily assume that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in every inner game. Then we define the utility of player \begin{equation*}
u_{j}^{outer}(m_{j}^{\prime},\vec{m}_{-J},\ \lambda_{j}^{\prime},\vec{\lambda}_{-j})\leq u_{j}^{outer}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})+\epsilon
\tag{7}
\end{equation*}
When there are multiple equilibria in the inner game, we define
Let\begin{equation*}
u_{j}^{outer,\mathrm{up}}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})=\begin{cases}
\sup u_{j}^{outer}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda}) & \mathrm{if}\ u_{j}^{outer}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})\neq\phi,\\
-\infty & \mathrm{elsewhere}.
\end{cases}
\tag{8}
\end{equation*}
In the same way we define:\begin{equation*}
u_{j}^{outer,\mathrm{low}}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})=\begin{cases}
\inf u_{j}^{outer}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda}) & \mathrm{if}\ u_{j}^{outer}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})\neq\phi,\\
-\infty & \mathrm{elsewhere}.
\end{cases}
\tag{9}
\end{equation*}
Note that when
Definition 12
A joint strategy \begin{equation*}
u_{j}^{outer,\mathrm{up}}(m_{j}^{\prime},\vec{m}_{-j},\ \lambda_{j}^{\prime},\vec{\lambda}_{-j})\leq u_{j}^{outer,\mathrm{low}}(\vec{m},\vec{\lambda})+\epsilon
\tag{10}
\end{equation*}
For the formal theorems and proofs referring to the two-stage game see the full version of this paper in [4].
Appendix E.Experiments-Addendum
Experiments-Addendum
In this section we provide a more detailed description of our experimental evaluation. An example of experiment is shown in Figure 8 with the corresponding table illustrating actual values in Table 1.
Explaining the results
The outcome of each simulation is a diagram with various plots, visualizing the dynamics, and a table with data describing the reached equilibrium. For the simulations reported here, we have always used the same stake distribution (sampled randomly from a Pareto distribution, as explained above) to make results more comparable (see Figure 7).
dynamics | displays the dynamic assignment of stake to pools. At the end of each simulation, once an equilibrium has been reached, we expect all stake to be assigned to ten pools of equal size. |
pools | shows the number of pools over time - this should end up at ten pools. |
In the tables describing the equilibrium (all found in the full version of this paper in [4]), the meaning of the columns is as follows:
player | Number of the player who leads the pool. Players are ordered by their potential |
rk | Pool rank. We expect our final pools to have ranks 1–10. |
crk | Pool leader's cost-rank: The player with the lowest costs has cost-rank 1, the player with the second lowest costs has cost-rank 2 and so on. For low values of |
srk | Pool leader's stake-rank: The player with the highest stake has stake-rank 1, the player with the second highest stake has stake-rank 2 and so on. For high values of |
cost | Pool costs. |
margin | Pool margin. |
player stake | Pool leader's stake. |
pool stake | Pool stake (including leader and members). |
reward | Pool rewards (before distributing them among leader and members). |
desirability | Pool desirability. |
In the full version of this paper in [4] we show the results of six exemplary simulations with various costs and values for parameter (which governs the influence of pool leader stake on pool desirability). In all cases the system stabilizes at 10 saturated pools.
In this version, we present as indicative the figure and the table when costs and
Low costs, low stake influence