A Universally Composable Key Exchange Protocol for Advanced Metering Infrastructure in the Energy Internet

The increasing adoption of multiway communications in the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) of the energy Internet, which is known as the Internet-based smart grid, raises a new question about the security of customers' sensitive data and how the data can be protected from growing cyber attacks such as side-channel and false data injection attacks. The dynamic nature of remote connect/disconnect of components in the AMI also brings new types of security threats. To achieve secure multiway communications and remote connect/disconnect of components, the AMI requires a key exchange protocol (KEP) that meets a number of its security requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, identification, authentication, and access control. In this context, in this article we present a KEP that uses an ideal crypto functionality and an ideal AMI key exchange functionality based on universal composability, which allows modular design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. The former functionality enables AMI components or users to perform authenticated cryptographic operations, while the later functionality enables the users to meet the AMI security requirements before generating a shared secret session key, which can be used in an ideal manner. We carry out experiments to validate the performance of our protocol, and the results show that our protocol offers better performance benefits compared to the existing related protocols and is suitable for the Energy Internet. We further demonstrate the usefulness of our ideal functionalities as a security reinforcement for a widely used KEP, namely the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.