SA–Based PMU Network Upgrade for Detectability of GPS Spoofing Attacks

Synchrophasor availability-based (SA-based) optimal PMU placement [1] has been developed to meet any specified long-run data availability profile across all buses in a power system in addition to providing synchrophasor observability, despite, for example, communication interruptions. In this paper, we impose a local detectability condition to the SA-based PMU placement problem to ensure that the resulting placement can also detect a GPS spoofing attack on any PMU using only a partial transmission circuit bordered by some PMUs, including the attacked PMU. The partial circuit is called a partition resulting from the application of a partition algorithm reported in [2] specific to the placement solution. Upon placement and partition, the performance of a proposed detection and isolation algorithm of GPS spoofing attacks is evaluated under different attack scenarios for the IEEE 300-bus system, including coordinated attacks, and the results are reported in this work.